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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood cases' are primarily
about the meaning and application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 2 The main question presented to
the Supreme Court is whether the Act requires the federal
government to accommodate certain for-profit businesses by
exempting them from a requirement that they include coverage for
certain "contraceptive methods [and] sterilization procedures" 3 in their
employees' insurance plans.
This is a question of statutory interpretation. Answering it will
probably involve answering others: Are "for-profit corporations
conducting commercial enterprises" 4 "person[s]" that can engage in the
"exercise of religion" (within the meaning of RFRA)? Does the
"burden" that the parties describe-that is, "coercing them . . . to
* Professor of Law and Concurrent Professor of Political Science, University of Notre
Dame. I am grateful to William Weaver and his colleagues at the Vanderbilt Law Review for
including me in this conversation and for their patience. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions
received from Randy Kozel, Kevin Walsh, Marc DeGirolami, and Nathan Chapman.
1. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-356). A petition in
another related case Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), petition for cert.
filed, No. 13-482 (Oct. 15, 2013)-is pending.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012).
3. 78 Fed. Reg. 39870, 39870 (July 2, 2013).
4. Brief for the Petitioners at 13, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 2014).
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violate their sincere belief that they cannot provide the four drugs and
devices at issue"-count as a "substantialH burden" on the parties'
"exercise of religion" (within the meaning of RFRA)? Is the coverage
requirement at issue the "least restrictive means of furthering [a]
compelling governmental interest" (within the meaning of RFRA)?
These are not metaphysical or moral questions; they are
questions about the meaning and application of statutes and
regulations that have been enacted and promulgated and that can be
revised and repealed.6 In other words, contrary to what has been
suggested in much of the coverage of and commentary about these
cases, the question before the Justices is (thankfully) not whether
corporations have a "soul"7 or "whether life begins at conception." 8
Hobby Lobby should not be seen as an attack on Griswold9 or an
opportunity to relitigate either Citizens United'o or NFIB v. Sebelius."
The objections to the Affordable Care Act's contraception-coverage
rules are not maneuvers in a supposed "war on women" or on
"modernity,"12 they are not part of a "deadly serious and sophisticated
campaign ... by religion for primacy in the public square,"13 and they
have nothing to do with the wrongs of the "Catholic cardinals from
Boston to Los Angeles [who] covered up the sexual abuse of children
and hid priests from prosecution[.]"14
5. Brief for the Respondents at 33-34, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354
(U.S. Oct. 21, 2013).
6. See Rick Garnett, Symposium: Accommodations, Religious Freedom, and the Hobby
Lobby Case, SCOTUSBLOG (February 28, 2014, 2:11 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-accommodations-religious-freedom-and-the-
hobby-lobby-case/.
7. Cf., e.g., David Cay Johnston, In Hobby Lobby Case, Supremes Tackle the Soul of
Corporations, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 27, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/do-corporations-
have-soul-207504.
8. Cf., e.g., Olga Khazan, Here's Why Hobby Lobby Thinks IUDs are Like Abortions, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/heres-
why-hobby-lobby-thinks-iuds-are-like-abortions/284382/.
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
11. NFIB v. Sebellius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
12. Linda Greenhouse, Doesn't Eat, Doesn't Pray and Doesn't Lore, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/opinion/greenhouse-doesnt-eat-doesnt-pray-and-
doesnt-love.html?pagewanted=all.
13. Linda Greenhouse, The Stories We Tell, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/opinion/greenhouse-the-stories-we-tell.html.
14. Leslie C. Griffin, Scandal at Notre Dame, VERDICT (March 14, 2014),
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/03/14/scandal-notre-
dame?utm source=Justia+Law&utm campaign=a7a094ell2-
summary-newsletters-practice&utm medium=email&utm term=0_92aabbfa32-a7a094ell2-
405962825.
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As I have argued elsewhere,15 the Obama Administration's
regulatory implementation of the statutory preventive-services
provision at issue in these cases imposes an unnecessary and therefore
unjustifiable burden on the exercise of religion-at least in some
cases. It is true that if a party invoking RFRA and objecting to a
government action on religious grounds is a corporation, it will often
be relevant to the merits of that objection. It is also true that the
government's regulatory authority with respect to "commerce," "the
economy," and "employment" is substantial, and that it is difficult to
exercise that authority in a way that entirely avoids imposing
unintended but substantial burdens on religiously motivated or
religiously inspired action. Usually, a for-profit corporation seeking an
exemption on religious grounds from a generally applicable law or
regulation will lose.
At the same time, for many, the life of faith and the practice of
religion are not limited to what happens in one's mind, home, or house
of worship. Many agree with First Lady Michelle Obama, who has
remarked that "[o]ur faith journey isn't just about showing up on
Sunday for a good sermon and good music and a good meal. It's about
what we do Monday through Saturday as well."16 Accordingly, and as
our civil rights laws illustrate, 7 religious commitments and
obligations are and should be respected in "public" and in "private."'8
It often makes sense and is the right thing to do-it is not only
"permissible" but also "praiseworthy"'9-to accommodate religious
believers through exemptions from otherwise generally applicable
laws, including laws that the majority regards as well-meaning and
wise. In Hobby Lobby, the accommodation is required by federal law.
However, several constitutional-law and law-and-religion
scholars-including Professors Gedicks and Koppelman, two friends
and colleagues of mine-have argued that it would violate the First
15. Richard W. Garnett, The Righteousness in Hobby Lobby's Cause, Los ANGELES TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.1atimes.com/opinion/commentary/1a-oe-garnett-obamacare-
contraception-surpreme-cou-2013 1205,0,2899.story#axzz2me5HYSO7; Richard W. Garnett, Why
Contraception Mandate Should be Scrapped, USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2011),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2011-11-27/hhs-contraception-
mandate/51424562/1.
16. Devin Dwyer, Michelle Obania Cites Jesus as Model for Citizenship, ABC NEWS (June
29, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/michelle-obama-cites-jesus-as-
model-for-citizenship/.
17. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2012).
18. See generally, e.g., ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD:
RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2009).
19. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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Amendment's Establishment Clause to exempt an "ordinary,
nonreligious, profit-seeking businessH" like Hobby Lobby from the
Affordable Care Act's contraception-coverage rules because that
Clause "prevents the government from requiring people to bear the
burden of religions to which they do not belong and whose teachings
they do not practice." 20 Of course, an official action that is prohibited
by the Establishment Clause (correctly understood) probably does not
"make sense" and is not "the right thing to do." This short essay
considers the Establishment Clause objection to Hobby Lobby's RFRA
claim.
II. AN INVITATION TO ACCOMMODATE
Generally speaking, as the Court put it more than sixty years
ago in Zorach, it "follows the best of our traditions" to "respectH the
religious nature of our people and accommodate[] the public service to
their spiritual needs."21 The Constitution allows governments and
officials to "single out" religion for "special constitutional protection."22
In fact, as Professor McConnell has observed, "it is virtually
impossible to understand our tradition of the separation of church and
state without recognizing that religion raises political and
constitutional issues not raised by other institutions or ideologies." 23
The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion. 24 The text
of the Constitution treats religion as "special" and so governments
may, should, and sometimes must treat it as "special" too.25 Although
there is an ongoing, lively, and sophisticated debate in the academy
about whether our practice and tradition of treating "religious"
20. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the 'Contraception Mandate' Threaten
Religious Liberty, WASH. POST (January 15, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/exemptions-from-the-contraception-mandate-threaten-
religious-liberty/20 14/0 1/15/f5cb9bd0-7d79- 1 1e3-93c1-0e888 170b723_story.html; see also Brief
for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks, et al., in support of the
Government, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2013); Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming April
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2328516; Micah
Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The Establishment Clause and the
Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013, 2:05 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html.
21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
22 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3
(2000).
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. But see Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351
(2012).
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motives, practices, commitments, and institutions with particular
respect and care are justifiable, they are our practice and tradition,
and they are consistent with the First Amendment's rule against
religious establishments.
Religion may be accommodated specifically and deliberately,
and not only by accident or as part of a larger accommodation effort
that includes possibly analogous, nonreligious concerns and motives.
That is, the Constitution allows governments to accommodate those
with religious commitments and objections even if it does not similarly
accommodate people with equally deep commitments and objections
that are philosophical, ethical, or conscientious in nature. 26 True,
Justice Harlan-and others before and since-asserted the
"unconstitutionality," for exemption purposes, of a "distinction ...
between religious and nonreligious beliefs" in the Welsh conscientious
objector case. 27 But, that assertion is not supported by American
history and practice or by the Court's decisions. Indeed, with respect
to RFRA itself, the Court has applied and enforced the Act and made
it clear that "case-by-case consideration of generally applicable
rules . . . does not violate the Establishment Clause." 2 8 Justice Stevens
argued to the contrary, in his Boerne opinion, claiming that the Act
gives religious claimants "a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic
can obtain" and that such a "preference for religion, as opposed to
irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment." 29 This argument
finds support in the work of some scholars and also, in fairness, in the
"neutrality" language employed in some of the Court's own opinions. 30
But, again, it is not consistent with our history and practice, or with
the text of the Constitution.
There is no incompatibility, or even tension, between the
Supreme Court's Smith decision 31  and the constitutional
permissibility of religious accommodation. In Smith, the Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause does not require the accommodation of
religious believers and practices through exemptions from generally
applicable, nondiscriminatory laws.3 2 More precisely, though, the
26. See, e.g., Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
27. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 359 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436
(2006) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)); see generally Richard W. Garnett &
Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Acconnodation Seriously: Religious Freedom and the 0 Centro Case,
2005-06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257, 276 (2006).
29. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
31. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32. Id.
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majority rejected the idea that the federal courts are constitutionally
authorized to second-guess legislative judgments about the feasibility
or advisability of such exemptions. 33 The animating concerns in
Smith, apart from a possible desire of some Justices to rule in accord
with a particular view of the First Amendment's original meaning,
seem to have involved separation of powers and federalism. The
Court's rejection of the Sherbert standard for religion-neutral
regulations that burden religiously motivated practices does not
proceed from the conviction that religiously motivated conduct is
particularly or especially harmful to other persons or to the common
good. The ruling does not presume or assert that danger and disorder
necessarily travel more closely with religious accommodations than
with other legal exemptions. There is no reason to read Smith as
endorsing the view that religious freedom is anything other than a
fundamental human right or as revealing any reservations about the
importance of protecting and promoting that freedom in the
complicated conditions of a pluralistic, diverse society. The message of
Smith is not that religion-blind, formal "neutrality" is the appropriate,
let alone the required, approach for governments to take regarding
religious belief, believers, and practices. Indeed, the Court sounded
like it expected governments to do otherwise. 34
After Smith, then, religion-respecting exemptions are usually
not constitutionally required, but they are nevertheless usually
worthy, welcome, and constitutional. The case does not affirm the
irrelevance or the dangers of religious freedom but instead what
Professor William Kelley has called the relative "primacy of political
actors in [the] accommodation of religion." 35 By enacting the RFRA,
Congress exercised that "primacy" and accepted the Court's invitation.
After insisting that "free exercise of religion" is an "unalienable right"
and recalling that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise," the national government subjected itself to constraints that
go above the floor set by the First Amendment. 36 In response to the
concerns expressed by the Court in Smith about intrusive judicial
second-guessing of policy choices, Congress said, in effect: "We think
religious liberty is important, that accommodations often make sense,
and that exemptions are sometimes warranted. We want the courts to
33. Id.
34. Id. at 890 ('[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation[.]").
35. William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in Accortmodation of Religion, 22 U.
HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012).
[Vol. 67:3944
ACCOMODATION & ESTABLISHMENT
be available, on a case-by-case basis, to check our work and to give our
cost-benefit calculations a second look." In so doing, Congress did not
violate the Establishment Clause.
III. ACCOMMODATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD
It appears that most of the scholars who contend that it would
violate the Establishment Clause to exempt Hobby Lobby from the
contraception-coverage regulations at issue accept or are resigned to
the fact that "RFRA seems facially to comply with the Establishment
Clause."37 Their claim, instead, is that "the government may not grant
religious exemptions when they impose significant burdens on
nonbeneficiaries." 38  Put differently, it is that "permissive
accommodations" violate the Establishment Clause "when they impose
significant burdens on third parties who do not believe or participate
in the accommodated practice." 39 And, it is urged, an exemption for
Hobby Lobby from the preventive-services rules would do just that,
"by shifting the material costs of accommodating anticontraception
beliefs from the employers who hold them to their employees who do
not."40
Several legal scholars have responded in detail to the
Establishment Clause objection to an accommodation in the Hobby
Lobby case. 41 As these scholars have explained, the interpretations of
the Court's precedents on which the objection relies-including Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor4 2-are mistaken. These cases do not stand for a
broad rule about the impermissibility of costly or cost-shifting
accommodations. And, to the extent that the Establishment Clause
does place limits on accommodations that are excessively burdensome
to the public or to identifiable nonbeneficiaries, RFRA would seem to
incorporate those limits into its standard of review. RFRA does not
37. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 20, at 7.
38. Schwartzman, Schragger & Tebbe, supra note 20.
39. Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 8.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby,
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2013). 1 am one of the represented
amici. See also, e.g., Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate Violate
the Establishment Clause, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-
violate-the-establishment-clause.html; Eugene Volokh, Would Granting arn Exemption from the
Employer Mandate Violate the Establishrrent Clause?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b -granting-exemption -employer -mandate -violate-
establishment-clause/.
42. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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say, after all, that "any person whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by a general law shall be exempted from that
law." It provides, instead, that exemptions are required in those cases
where a substantial burden is imposed on religious exercise and the
"application of the burden to the person ... is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest[] and ... is the least restrictive
means of furthering" that interest. It seems very unlikely that an
accommodation that is required by RFRA would implicate the Caldor
Court's concerns about the "unyielding weighting" of religious
objectors' concerns over other (private and public) interests. 4 3 The
justices said in Cutter that, when applying the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, "courts must take adequate account
of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries," 44 but RFRA, by its own terms, appears to require
courts to do precisely that.
Now, there is broad agreement that the Constitution places
some limits on the ability of governments to accommodate religious
believers and institutions through exemptions from otherwise
applicable rules. An accommodation could be unconstitutional, for
example, if it were not "administered neutrally among different
faiths."45 And, again, it is true that in a few cases the Court has
treated the burdens that an accommodation would impose on third
parties or on the government as relevant to the question whether the
accommodation is constitutionally permissible. At the same time, it is
worth remembering that any imaginable legislative accommodation
will benefit some (i.e., those whose religiously motivated practices are
being burdened and from whom that burden is being lifted by the
accommodation) more or rather than others. There is no constitutional
requirement that the accommodation of religion, "permissive" or
"mandatory," be entirely uncomplicated or completely cost-free.
There is also, as there so often is in constitutional law, the
issue of the "baseline."46 The argument that an exemption for Hobby
Lobby and other employers would violate the Establishment Clause
takes as the relevant starting point, or baseline, the requirement that
employers provide employees with no-cost-sharing contraception
43. Id. at 710.
44. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
45. Id.
46. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 20, at 34 ("Any argument about impermissible cost
shifting must identify the proper status quo ante as the baseline measure of whether and to
what extent costs have been shifted.").
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coverage and employees' entitlement to that coverage. 47 But, surely
Congress could depart from that asserted baseline by undoing the
contraception-coverage rules in their entirety without violating the
Establishment Clause. The argument is also strange because it allows
the regulation that imposes the unnecessary and therefore unlawful
burden on religious exercise to create entitlements or interests that
then block the ability of a court to lift that unlawful burden through
an exemption. The Affordable Care Act, like all federal laws, is subject
to and incorporates RFRA's religious-exercise-protecting invitation for
judicial review. It should not trump or somehow block application of
that review. The "cost" that, according to the argument, is being
shifted from the objecting religious employer to the employee is one
that-because, we can assume, it constituted an unnecessary but
substantial burden on religious exercise-RFRA did not allow the
government to impose on that employer in the first place. 48
Again, these and similar responses to the Establishment
Clause objection have been set out in detail elsewhere. This essay
concludes by proposing another way of thinking about both the
accommodation of religion and the Establishment Clause objection.
It is "black letter" law and a bar-review staple that the
Establishment Clause requires that government actions have a
"secular purpose." The line that, in the Court's opinions, separates
"secular" purposes from others is not always clear but, in any event, it
is clear that the protection and promotion of religious freedom
"counts" as such a purpose. Whatever the Lemon test means when it
disapproves official actions that "advance" religion, it is not the case
that the Establishment Clause forbids or calls for skepticism
regarding efforts by political authorities to improve the religious-
freedom landscape or to make it possible for people and institutions to
exercise religion. Under our Constitution, the government is not
required to settle for formal or "religion-blind" neutrality. It can and
should also take positive steps to ensure that meaningful "freedom for
religion" is a reality. A statute like RFRA, which invites the assistance
of courts in identifying substantial but unintentionally imposed and
47. See, e.g., id. at 37 ("The Mandate thus marks the baseline for measuring whether such
exemptions shift costs from the accommodated employers to employees who do not share their
employer's religious anti-Mandate beliefs.").
48. See generally Kevin Walsh, A Baseline Problem for the "Burden on Employees"
Arguient Against RFRA-Based Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate, MIRROR OF
JUSTICE (Jan. 17, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/01/a -baseline-
problem-for-the -burden-on-employees -argument-against-rfra -based-exemptions -from -the-
contr.html.
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unnecessary burdens on religious exercise is just one example of such
a positive step.
A community that values and is committed to religious freedom
will not settle for identifying and lifting the burdens that will
inevitably be imposed-even by conscientious legislators. It will also
attend to what I have described elsewhere as the "infrastructure" of
religious freedom. 49 As Professor Balkin has observed, this freedom
requires "more than mere absence of government censorship or
prohibition to thrive; [it] also require[s] institutions, practices, and
technological structures that foster and promote [it]."0 To be clear,
appreciating the importance of religious freedom's infrastructure,
sustaining conditions, and ecology is entirely consistent with the rule
that government action should have a "secular purpose."51 Non-
coercive support for these conditions-and a working accommodations
regime is such a condition-that make it possible for people to pursue
a human good and enjoy a human right has, in fact, an appropriately
"secular" purpose.
These sustaining conditions require investment, maintenance,
and support. They sometimes "cost" us. An example: This year marks
the 5 0th anniversary of the Court's landmark decision in New York
Times v. Sulivan.52 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan
identified an atmosphere of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
debate as a kind of shared, public good to which we have a "profound
national commitment" notwithstanding the undeniable reality that
the preservation of that good comes at a cost.5 3 As he conceded, the
protection and enjoyment of this public good necessarily involves
tolerating "excesses and abuses" and imposing burdens ("unpleasantly
sharp attacks") on particular and identifiable people. 54 Still, this
atmosphere, like the physical one on which we depend for life, is a
public good and sustaining it is a worthy public project. It is not cost-
free, but it is worth the cost.
The same is true for religious freedom. Religious freedom in a
pluralistic society and under the regulatory state requires a
willingness to-sometimes, not always-accommodate religious
believers and institutions through exemptions from generally
49. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008).
50. Jack Balkin, The Infrastructure of Religious Freedom, BALKINIZATION (May 5, 2007,
3:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/05/infrastructure-of-religious-freedom.html.
51. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002).
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. Id. at 254.
54. Id. at 270-72.
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applicable laws. This is true despite-or, perhaps, precisely because-
of the Court's decision in Smith. The accommodation will not be free or
cheap, and governments should do all they can to be sure that the
costs of sustaining religious freedom are fairly distributed. Contrary to
the suggestion that runs through the Establishment Clause objection,
though, it is not unfair that, sometimes, we have to bear some of the
cost of accommodating those whose beliefs we do not share or whose
religious tradition is not our own. The accommodation of religion, and
the application of statutes like RFRA, should not be regarded simply
as the moving around of private entitlements or the doling out of
privileges and benefits to some at the expense of others. We all have a
stake in efficient and transparent markets, functioning courts, and
clean air. Similarly, we all benefit, whatever our religious tradition
and whether or not we embrace or practice a religious faith at all,
from practices and commitments-like the accommodation of
religion-that place limits on the state, on its demands, and on its
authority. "
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment's rule against establishments of religion
is crucially important, even if disagreements persist about its content
and contours. This rule, correctly understood, protects the freedom of
religion and contributes to religious liberty by constraining
government and preserving space for different ways of life, multiple
authorities, distinctive communities, and individual liberty. The
scholars who have reminded us of the relevance of the Establishment
Clause to many of the cases involving the relationship, and sometimes
the tension, between religious freedom and regulation have, in so
doing, done a service. In the Hobby Lobby case, however,
accommodation of religion would not amount to an establishment of
religion.
55. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the
Structure of Freedom, in JOHN WITTE JR. & FRANK S. ALEXANDER, CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010).
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